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Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 716
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9720

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN VIENNA TALKS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE DESCRIBES THE GENERAL TACTICAL LINE US DEL WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS OF THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. NOW THAT THE ALLIES HAVE TABLED THEIR NOVEMBER 22 PROPOSAL, THE MAIN ISSUE WHICH NOW FACES THEM IS HOW TO GET THE SOVIETS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION OF THAT PROPOSAL. IF ALLIES CAN BRING SOVIETS TO BEGIN THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS WITH TREATMENT OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES, MUCH WILL HAVE BEEN DONE TOWARD USING ALLIED APPROACH AS BASIS OF
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OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE TALKS THUS FAR, THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS HAVE IN FACT INDICATED SOME DEGREE OF INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THE ALLIED CONCEPT THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO SEPARATE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE FIRST FOCUSING ON US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

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EXPLICIT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP NEGOTIATIONS ON LINES OF ALLIED RATHER THAN SOVIET APPROACH WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. HOWEVER, IT IS WORTH EXPLOITING THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF EAST TO DISCUSS THIS POSSIBILITY TO PUSH IN THE DESIRED DIRECTION, AND ALLIED TACTICS IN THE COMING WEEKS SHOULD BE CONCEIVED TO SUPPORT THIS OBJECTIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. VIEWED ANALYTICALLY, THE FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS MAY BE CONSIDERED THE CORE ELEMENT OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR PHASE I. IF AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT CAN BE REACHED, OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION FLOW FROM IT NATURALLY. AGREEMENT TO CONFINE PHASE I REDUCTIONS TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN REDUCTIONS WOULD ENTAIL ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT THAT TREATMENT OF EUROPEAN NATO FORCES WILL BE RESERVED FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. SIMILARLY, AGREEMENT TO AT LEAST BEGIN THE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS WITH A DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD ENTAIL SOME DEGREE OF WILLINGNESS TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION ON AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. IF THE ALLIES CAN BRING THE SOVIETS TO BEGIN THE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES, THEY WOULD TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT SUCCEED IN MORE GENERAL TERMS IN BRINGING THEM TO USE THE OVERALL ALLIED CONCEPT RATHER THAN THE SOVIET ONE AS THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF THE ALLIED APPROAHC WITH THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS, THE LATTER, RATHER THAN REJECTING OUTRIGHT THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF A TWO PHASE NEGOTIATION IN WHICH US-SOVIET FORCES IS RESERVED FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, HAVE SHOWN PERCEPTIBLE INTEREST IN THE DETAILS OF HOW THIS CONCEPT MIGHT BE APPLIED AND ARTICULATED.

4. THIS INTEREST IS TENTATIVE AND PROVISIONAL BUT IT APPEARS TO PRESENT AN OPENING FOR THE ALLIES. IT IS DESIRABLE TO EXPLOIT THIS OPENING, AND TO SEE IF WE CAN BRING THE SOVIETS INTO ACTIVE DIALOGUE ON US-SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS. THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLIED TACTICS SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON DEVELOPING IMPETUS IN THAT

DIRECTION.

5. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD PLACE GREATEST EMPHASIS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST ON THE NECESSITY OF MOVING RAPIDLY TO DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AS THE MOST PRACTICAL AND DIRECT ROAD TO PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IDEALLY, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT TO BREAK THIS MOMENTUM WITH A DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. (SEE DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES IN SEPTEL.) BUT IF THERE HAS TO BE DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES PRIOR TO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS, THIS TOO SHOULD BE SO STRUCTURED AS TO EMPHASIZE THE US-SOVIET ASPECT.

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6. PROBABLY THE BEST WAY TO FURTHER THE CONCEPT OF A FOCUS ON US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS TO SEPARATE IT INTO TWO COMPONENT STEPS, AIMING FIRST AT GAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SOVIET-US FORCES, AND SECOND AT OBTAINING AGREEMENT THAT THIS FOCUS SHOULD BE FURTHER NARROWED TO US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES. VIEWED OBJECTIVELY, ALLIED ARGUMENTATION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FIRST FOCUS ON US-SOVIET FORCES HAS CONSIDERABLE INTRINSIC PLAUSIBILITY. FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS, IT APPARENTLY HAS GREATER POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE EAST THAN THE ALLIED ARGUMENT THAT NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

7. TO SUCCEED IN THE FIRST STEP, THE ALLIES WILL, IN ADDITION TO ACTIVELY EMPHASIZING TO THE SOVIETS THE IMPORTANCE THAT THEY ATTACH TO STARTING WITH US-SOVIET FORCES AND THE REASONS WHY THIS IS OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED, ALSO HAVE TO DEAL IN SOME WAY WITH SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN INTEREST IN DISCUSSING REDUCTIONS OF OTHER NATO FORCES, PARTICULARLY FRG FORCES. ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO GIVE GIVING THE EAST THE MINIMUM COMMITMENT NECESSARY TO CREATE AT LEAST SOME DEGREEOF ASSURANCE ON ITS PART ON THE PART OF THE EAST THAT THERE WILL IN FACT BE A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION IN WHICH FEDERAL GERMAN FORCES WILL BE COVERED. AT SAME TIME, ALLIES WILL HAVE TO AVOID PERMITTING THE EAST TO SHIFT FOCUS OF DISCUSSION TO EUROPEAN NATO FORCES. IN ORDER TO GET INTO SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS ON US-SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, THE ALLIES WILL PROBABLY ALSO HAVE TO BE WILLING TO ADDRESS IN SOME FORM THE ISSUE OF THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THIS SHOULD FOLLOW AS A SECOND STEP.

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8. US REP HAD INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON ABOE LINES, STRESSING THAT THEY REPRESENTED PERSONAL VIEWS, WITH UK AND FRG REPS ON MORNING OF NOVEMBER 23. UK AND FRG REPS AGREED WITH THIS GENERAL LINE OF THOUGHT. THE THREE REPS TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT DURING FORTHCOMING PLENARY, ALLIES SHOULD HINT IN A CAREFULLY FORMULATED WAY SOME DEGREE OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN INTEREST IN ASSURANCES THAT NATO EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE COVERED IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT, IN INFORMAL CONTACT WITH SOVIETS JUST PRIOR TO MID-DECEMBER BREAK, ALLIES SHOULD GO SLIGHTLY FURTHER IN INDICATING WILLING-NESS TO GIVE SUCH ASSURANCES.

9. TO MEET FIRST AIM OF TREATING SUBJECT IN PLENARY, THREE ALLIED REPS TENTATIVELY AGREED TO FLOAT IN AD HOC GROUP AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME DURING FORTHCOMING DISCUSSION OF PLENARY STATEMENTS TEXT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES FOR INCLUSION IN SECOND OR THIRD OF PLANNED PLENARY STATEMENTS.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS DESIBABLE FOR THE REDUCTIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN TWO PHASES.

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2. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THESE PHASES SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED SUCCESSIVELY AND THAT EACH SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY A SEPARAZE AGREEMENT.

3. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT IN THE FIRST PHASE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AND THAT WE AGREE ON THE

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 717
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 9720

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

4. THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A COMMON CEILING.

5. WE ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE OF A DEFINITE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES.

6. THE PRECISE NATURE OF THIS LINK IS SOMETHING WHICH WE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
END TEXT.

10. THE ALLIED REPS ALSO TENTATIVELY AGREED TO SUGGEST TO THEIR

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AUTHORITIES THE DESIRABILITY OF A FORMULA ALONG LINES SET FORTH BELOW TO BE INFORMALLY PUT TO THE SOVIETS PERIOR TO THE MID-DECEMBER BREAK. THE FORMULA, WHICH IS SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT IN FURTHER DISCUSSION AMONG THE THREE REPS AND WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN AD HOC GROUP UNTIL FURTHER WORK IS DONE, IS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.

IF YOU ARE WILLING TO AGREE TO START DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THE TOPICS OF REDUCTIONS IN US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO COMMIT OURSELVES THAT THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE: (1) THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT; THIS PERIOD WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT; AND (2) THAT NON-US NATO FORCES WOULD BE ADDRESSED (OR INCLUDED) IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

END TEXT.

11. THE REFERENCE TO THE COMMON CEILING WAS INCLUDED IN POSSIBLE FORMULA AT INSISTANCE OF FRG REP. EMPHASIS ON COMMON CEILING COVERING ALL NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCES COULD STAND IN WAY OF ALLIED EFFORT TO EXPLOIT APPARENT EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A FOCUS ON US-SOVIET FORCES IF THERE IS ADEQUATE ASSURANCE ON PHASE II COVERAGE. LEADING OFF WITH COMMON CEILING MIGHT ALSO CREATE OPENING FOR EAST TO INSIST ON COMMON CEILING IN BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES, AS INDICATED BY KVITSINSKIY ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE COMMON CEILING THEME SHOULD BE KEPT IN PLAY, ALTHOUGH TACTICALLY SUBORDINATED AT THIS POINT TO THE FOCUS ON US-SOVIET FORCES, AND WE DOUBT SOVIETS WOULD INDICATE MUCH READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC AT OUTSET. MOREOVER, IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP FRG ASSURED THAT US WILL MAKE REAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON THIS ASPECT OF ALLIED APPROACH.

12. PHRASING OF FORMULA ABOVE WITH REGARD TO POINT IN TIME IN WHICH SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WAS ALSO IN RESPONSE TO DESIRES OF FRG REP. IN DISCUSSION WITH UK AND FRG REPS, US REP ARGUED THAT, IDEALLY, SECOND PHASE SHOULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND THERE HAD BEEN TIME TO TEST QUALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION.

FRG REP SAID CURRENT FRG POSITION ENVISAGED COMMENCEMENT OF SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY AFTER CONSULSION OF FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS, WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE RUNNING CONCURRENTLY WITH NEGOTIATIONS OF SECOND PHASE. US REP SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO DECIDE THIS ISSUE AND RECOMMENDED

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LANGUAGE "ON FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" WHICH DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW
LONG PERIOD WILL BE BETWEEN FIRST PHASE SIGNATURE AND BEGINNING
OF SECOND NEGOTIATIONS, OR WHETHER SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD BEGIN BEFORE, DURING, OR AFTER IMPLEMENTATION FIRST
PHASE AGREEMENT.

13. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SUGGESTED FORMULA WOULD BE TO GIVE
SOVIETS SOMETHING TO THINK ABOUT DURING DECEMBER BREAK AND TO
BOLSTER THEME TO WHICH ALLIES WOULD RETURN WHEN TALKS RESURME
IN JANUARY. IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOVIETS WOULD WISH TO HAVE MOVE
DEFINITE INFORMATION ABOUT PHASES THAN THEY ARE PROMISED IN
THE FORMULA ABOVE, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT ALLIES WOULD AND SHOULD
HOLD LINE AT SUGGESTED POINT FOR SOME TIME TO COME, TELLING EAST
THAT ALLIES HAVE NOW GIVEN ADEQUATE ASSURANCE ON ISSUE OF INTEREST
TO THEM AND THAT DETAILS WILL BE WRITTEN INTO AGREEMENT AT
APPROPRIATE POINT OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH
THE EAST, GERMANS WILL BE IN POSITION TO REITERATE FRG ASSURANCES
TO SOVIETS THAT BUNDESWEHR WILL BE INCLUDED IN SECOND PHASE AND
ALLIES CAN ALSO REFER TO THESE ASSURANCES. BUT GERMANS WILL BE
SENSITIVE TO BEING SINGLED OUT IN ALLIED ASSURANCE TO
SOVIETS ABOUT CONTENT OF PHASE II, AT THIS STATE, AND IT IS
TACTICALLY UNDESIRABLE EITHER TO GET INTO DETAIL IN THIS AREA
OR TO GIVE EAST TOO MUCH SATISFACTION ON THIS POINT TOO EARLY.

14. EVEN IF SOMETHING ON ABOVE LINES SHOULD PROVE SUFFICIENT
TO MEET SOVIET INTERESTS FOR TIME BEING TO PERMIT OPENING OF
SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, SOVIETS WOULD
PROBABLY STILL INSIST ON OBTAINING SOME DEGREE OF SATISFACTION
ON INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS BEFORE INDICATING
WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE FOR ALLIES TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO ADDRESS
GROUND FORCES SIMPLY BY EMPHASIZING THE REASONS FOR DOING SO.
BUT IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO GIVE EAST
SOME SORT OF ASSURANCE, WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAIL AND WITHOUT
FIRM COMMITMENTS, ON THIS POINT AS WELL AS ON ISSUE OF INCLUSION
OF NATIONAL FORCES.
SECRET

15. IN NOVEMBER 24 DISCUSSION WITH FRG AND UK REPS, WE MENTIONED
THIS ISSUE, BUT DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP PRECISE LANGUAGE
SINCE WE WISH TO FOLLOW TACTIC OF TRYING TO DEAL FIRST WITH
OVERALL US-SOVIET ASPECT, WHERE THE ALLIES HAVE A STRONG
AND PLAUSIBLE SELLING POINT, SATISFYING THE SOVIETS
IF POSSIBLE WITH A MIMINAL COMMITMENT REGARDING COVERAGE OF
EUROPEAN FORCES IN PHASE II, AND FOR TIME BEING, TO SIMPLY AVOID
DISCUSSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR MATTERS WHEN THE EAST RAISES
IT. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS BECOME INSISTENT
ON THIS POINT AND REQUIRE SOME SATISFACTION PRIOR TO ACTUALLY
ENGAGING IN DISCUSSION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS,
THE ALLIES MAY HAVE TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS "TO DISCUSS SOME OTHER
ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION" AT A LATER POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE EVENT OF SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

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THIS ISSUE HOWEVER IS FOR LATTER STAGE IN DEVELOPMENT UNLESS EVENTS MOVE MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE EXPECT.

16. IF ALLIES ARE FINALLY SUCCESSFUL IN ENGAGING EAST IN DISCUSSION OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AS FIRST ASPECT OF REDUCTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED, ALLIES WILL HAVE TO WORK CAREFULLY ON TACTICS OF HOW COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IS TO BE MESHED INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED PHASE I REDUCTION PROPOSAL. BUT THE IMPORTANT ISSUE IS TO FIND A SPECIFIC POINT ON ALLIED GROUND WHERE THE DETAILED DIALOGUE CAN BEGIN. AT PRESENT READING, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT FOCUS ON US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES MAY BE THAT POINT.

17. WE INTEND TO DEVELOP THESE VIEWS FURTHER WITH UK AND FRG AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH OTHER ALLIES AND WOULD WELCOME WASHINGTON COMMENT, ESPECIALLY FORMULA IN PARAGRAPH 10 ABOVE.
HUMES

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